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Christians are becoming increasingly vocal in their criticism of scientific psychology. In
their criticisms Christian anti-psychologists have devalued knowledge gained through
research and suggested both that the scientific method is inappropriate for studying human
behavior and that the deception inherent in psychological research is immoral This article
examines these concerns and argues that the more subjective alternatives suggested by the
critics of psychology suffer fiten many of the same limitations as scientific psychology and
that taking such an approach would amount to substituting uncontrolled error for controlled
error and uncontrolled deception for controlled deception

Throughout the short history of modern
psychology, the Christian community has
viewed both the methods and results of
psychology with suspicion. While this sus־
picion has a broad base, many concerns can be
traced to psychology’s approach to knowledge
through the use of the scientific method. When
psychology emerged from philosophy as a
separate discipline, its distinctiveness was in
its adoption of scientific methodology from the
natural sciences. The issues of philosophical
psychology were reframed to conform to, and
were explained within the confines of, the
modem scientific model. Empiricism, deter־
minism, relativism, and reductionism became
the major tenets of psychology. This reframing
meant that certain questions, not suitable for
scientific investigation, could not be asked and
others could not be answered satisfactorily.
For the most part, however, use of the
scientific method has provided us with a

unique perspective on human behavior that
cannot be duplicated by other disciplines
using different methodologies.
Some Christians, however, are uncomfortable with psychology in its empirical form.
For example, a recent issue of the BibleScience Newsletter, normally dedicated to
promoting creationism, devoted an entire
issue to critiquing psychology. Articles from
this issue included “ The Failure of Modern
Psychology” (Thom, 1986), “Why Bother
With Psychology?” (Bartz, 1986), and
“ Sensible Psychology: How Creation Makes
the Difference” (Pearcy, 1986). These articles
warn that modem psychology is spiritually
dangerous, that psychology is not a science,
and that psychology is invalid since it relies on
ways of knowing other than through authority
(i.e., the Bible). But when Christians, or
others, criticize psychology’s reliance on
empirical methods, they are attacking its
distinctiveness and what has made it a
valuable contributor to human understanding.
Further, in arguing for the use of nonempirical methods, the critics of psychology
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overlook the weaknesses in the alternative
methods that they advocate. This article
examines the current criticism of scientific
psychology and the alternatives implied or
suggested by the critics.
Conflicting Paths to Knowledge
Part of the conflict between Christian antipsychologists and psychology is over the
proper path to knowledge. There is, of course,
more than one way to knowledge and each
path to knowledge has its strengths and limits.
Perhaps the oldest approach is a reliance on
“authority.” In this view, answers to mysteries
can be obtained by reference to recognized
authorities. The Bible is such an authority to
Christians because of its revelatory nature. A
second path to knowledge is through ‘‘intuition
and subjective experience.” An example of
this would be creative writers and artists who
represent a view of reality based on their
personal experiences and on their interpretation of that experience. The wide variety in
the experiences of writers provides us with
varied and interesting interpretations of the
world. A third path to knowledge is through
“logic and rational thought” Rationalism
relies on reason to establish truth. A fourth
path to knowledge is through “logical positivism,” which rejects intuition as a reliable
source of knowledge and relies instead on
observation. While logic and reason are a
valuable part of the process, confirmation
must ultimately come through observation and
experimentation.
Logical positivism serves as the philosophical foundation for a psychology which
emphasizes observation, measurement, and
experimentation(i.e., empiricism) as necessary
components in the search for knowledge.
Christianity, on the other hand, emphasizes
reliance on revelation as an authority and
values faith and subjective experiences. It is
not surprising, then, that a religion that
emphasizes faith and belief in forces which
cannot be seen, measured, or quantified, has
difficulty accepting a methodology that
emphasizes that which can be seen, measured,
and quantified.

This conflict between Christianity’s approach to knowledge and other approaches
can, at times, take on tones of anti-intellectualism. For example, Leahey (1980) in his
history of psychology notes that some
Christians have always rejected the role of
reason in seeking truth, and writes:
It should be pointed out that not all Christian thinkers in
whatever time have accepted the rule of reason in seeking
Godly truth. Augustine had to struggle against ideas of
those like Tertullian (160-230) who rejected the classical
philosophers. St Bernard ( 1091-115 3) decried excessive
“curiosity ״about Christian beliefs. Savonarola (14521498) burnt heretical books.. . . All these people emphasized the mystical aspects . . . the immediate inward
confrontation of man with God.. . . They rejected reason
as at best unnecessary, at worst heretical, (p. 58)

This concern over the proper path to knowledge
continues today and can be seen in the
attitudes of some Christians. Tim LaHaye
(1980) writes, “Only two lines of reasoning
permeate all of literature: biblical revelation
(the wisdom of God) and the wisdom of man”
(p. 27). LaHaye believes that man’s use of his
reasoning abilities has had an evil influence in
the development of western civilization and is
pervasive today. Similarly, William Kirk
Kilpatrick ( 1983), in expressing his belief that
psychology is a destructive force, writes,
“You needn’t be a scholar to sense this. In
fact, scholarship is often a hindrance to
understanding what is really happening” (p.
30). Like St. Bernard, LaHaye, Kilpatrick,
and other Christian critics of psychology seem
to decry excessive curiosity, at least when
applied to human behavior.
If reason is not an acceptable source for
reliable knowledge, then knowledge gained
through approaches that use reason are not to
be trusted. To deal with such a weakness in
psychology, some Christian critics emphasize
the spiritual over the psychological. For
example, Billheimer (1977) writes:
Except where there is organic difficulty, the root of all
conflicts in the home is not mental, but spiritual
Psychology and psychiatry are usually totally irrelev an t. . . Many spiritually discerning persons are quite
convinced that psychiatry is Satan’s substitute for the
Biblical remedy for disturbed relations, (p. 89)

Others would argue that psychology isn’t
merely “irrelevant” but rather is the cause of
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many, of society’s problems. For example,
Paul Vitz (1977) argues that psychology is
“deeply anti-Christian” and has been for
years “destroying individuals, families, and
communities” because of its “destructive
logic” (p. 10). Even attempts at Christian
psychologies are accused of diluting the “milk
of the word” (Smith, 1975). Others, focusing
on different paths to knowledge put forth by
psychology and theology, have argued that
when empirical psychology and the Bible
contradict, the authority of the Bible must take
precedence (Crabb, 1981). While it is beyond
the scope of this article to specifically deal
with the question of biblical authority (see
Breshears & Larzelere, 1981), it does appear
that among Christians and Christian psychologists there exists a widespread, broadly based
anti-psychology movement
Christian Anti-Psychology and
Non-Empirical Ways of Knowing
Two Christian critics of psychology,
William Kirk Kilpatrick (1983, 1985) and
Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen (1982, 1985)
have emerged in recent years as particularly
visible and have the distinction of making their
living in psychology while at the same time
critiquing it. While Kilpatrick and Van
Leeuwen criticize psychology from different
perspectives, underlying both sets of concerns
is a discomfort with psychology’s empirical
path to knowledge and a belief that psychologists overlook important intuitive sources of
knowledge in their quest for objectivity.
An example of this emphasis on intuition
and devaluing of empiricism can be seen in
Kilpatrick’s (1983) book, Psychological
Seduction Here Kilpatrick accuses psychology
of not only leading Christians away from their
faith but that even non-Christians have “been
led away from . . . [their] better instincts and
common sense” (p. 26). Kilpatrick highly
values “common sense” in his book, but does
not value scientific research. For example,
Kilpatrick attempts to make the point that
there is reason to “doubt the competence of
psychological helpers” (p. 28). Kilpatrick first
makes his point by uncritically listing a string
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of unreferenced studies which indicate that
nonintervention is as useful as psychotherapeutic intervention, and second by pointing
out that the field of psychology has grown at
the same time as the number of psychological
problems in our society. Although Kilpatrick
does not cite any numbers to support his
argument, he nevertheless is implying a
statistical case against psychology. He then
goes further, though, and devalues his own
empirical case, writing:
I don’t want to leave the impression that there is
conclusive proof of psychology’s failure. Statistical
evidence always has its problems. For instance, the fact
that two things occur together is no proof that one causes
the other.. . . The fact that the growth of psychology
corresponds to growing social prolems could conceivably
be only a coincidence, (p. 33)

Since Kilpatrick ( 1983) is clearly devaluing
research here, how then does he expect the
reader to determine the fitness of psychology?
Ideas are to be checked against “ common
sense. ״Kilpatrick writes:
Take, for example, two of the most tenaciously held
claims of popular psychology: the idea that role-playing
stunts our self-expression and the idea that venting anger
is good for us. If you subject either of these notions to a
moment’s reflection, you will see there are a great many
instances where the reverse is true. (p. 34)

While claiming that two of psychology’s most
tenaciously held claims are that “role playing
stunts our self-expression” and “venting anger
is good for us” is wildly misrepresentative, our
main interest here is his belief that a “moment’s
reflection” will invalidate psychological research. Christian anti-psychologists often
seem to value intuitive processes like “reflection” and “common sense” above psychology’s
empirical tradition of systematic research. But
they fail to see that what is “common sense” to
one person may not be to another. It is
common sense that, in dating, “birds of a
feather flock together.” In other words, the
more similar people are, the more they will be
attracted to each other. It is also common
sense that “opposites attract” Conflicts such
as these arise because a person’s common
sense is actually a collection of their personal
experiences and beliefs and may have little or
nothing in common with another person’s
experiences and beliefs.
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Since Kilpatrick (1983) makes it clear
that he does not value “ scholarship” and
empirical ways of knowing, and that he
believes psychology is replacing religion, you
might expect that he would make his case
against psychology on the basis of Scripture
and reference to authority, as many Christian
critics do. Kilpatrick, however, prefers intuition
and subjective experience to authority, and
supports his case through personal experience,
anecdotes, and even the literary characters of
creative writers. Kilpatrick opens his book
with an anecdote based on his personal
experience, and these kinds of examples
populate his entire book. At one point he
suggests that psychology has created a “climate
of unrelenting seriousness” (p. 64). Then,
after pointing out that “I cannot prove
statistically what I am about to say” (which is
a peculiar comment since he does not value
statistics), he suggests that this “unrelenting
seriousness” has produced a social climate
which “does not allow much room for spirited
eccentricity, for the larger-than-life character
represented in literature by Sir John Falstaff
or Samuel Pickwick” (p. 65). Kilpatrick’s
reference to the “climate of unrelenting
seriousness” in the world illustrates another
part of the problem with intuitive ways of
knowing. We regret that Kilpatrick perceives
the world as being unrelentingly serious, but
since our subjective worlds are not, we believe
he is overgeneralizing. In fact, it is possible
that Kilpatrick is the only person in existence
with this feeling of unrelenting seriousness.
His subjective experience tells him that his
world perception is real but it cannot tell him
what others are experiencing. Further, his
reasoning that since characters like John
Falstaff don’t exist in society, psychology
must be preventing it, may make intuitive
sense but sounds irrational and is a good
argument for the use of logic and empirical
methods.
Kilpatrick’s( 1983) case against empirical
psychology, then, is primarily based on
intuition and is made up of selective “ statistics”—that are largely unreported, unreferenced,
and not respected by the author himself—
anecdotes, personal experience, and reference

to creative writers and their literary characters.
While it is an interesting collection of material,
it represents only one person’s private world
view. Empirical research, on the other hand,
requires public verifiability to avoid this kind
of subjectivism and overgeneralization.
Like Kilpatrick (1983), Christian psychology critic Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen ( 1982,
1985) values subjective experience over the
empiricism of psychology and would replace
or at least modify the methods of psychology
to make more room for intuition and subjective
experience. Van Leeuwen’s criticisms, however, are better supported and more specific
than Kilpatrick’s, and more clearly focus on
psychology’s methodology.
Van Leeuwen (1982) likens modern
psychology to a “sorcerer’s apprentice,” a
reference to psychology’s patterning of itself
after the natural sciences. In her attacks on the
methodology of psychology, she focuses on
experimental psychology and its reliance on
controlled conditions. Van Leeuwen argues
that (a) psychology’s experimental methodology has shown itself to be unsuccessful in
achieving what a science of psychology aims
to achieve, and (b) the moral cost of psychological experimentation is unacceptably high.
We will return later to her concern over the
morality of psychological research and focus
at this point on her concern over psychology’s
use of the experimental method.
Among other criticisms, Van Leeuwen
(1982) argues that the experimental method is
inappropriate for psychological research since
humans exhibit reflexivity in experiments
when they know the purpose of the experiments,
that experimental results are not exportable
since they are situation-specific, and that the
adoption of the methods of the natural
sciences has led psychology to ignore “ many
specifically human concerns” (p. 305). While
it is beyond the scope of this article to respond
to all of her charges (see Foster, 1984; Yeats,
1984), it is interesting to note that, like
Kilpatrick ( 1983), Van Leeuwen uses anecdotes
and personal experience in a way that goes
beyond simple illustration and shows her
preference for this particular way of knowing.
Van Leeuwen (1982) periodically punc
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tuates her arguments with stories from her
personal experience and the experiences of
others. While it is common to illustrate with
stories, Van Leeuwen and Kilpatrick (1983)
go beyond this and seem to build their cases on
such experiences and “ common sense.” For
example, in arguing that psychology’s use of
deception has created a climate of suspicion in
the country, Van Leeuwen uses the story of a
student who bursts into her office after having
just found a person lying in a pool of blood. In
explaining why he hesitated in coming to call
for help, he stated, “I thought it was just
another psychology experiment” (p. 303).
The ironic thing about this example is that it
follows a lengthy chastisement of psychology
for overgeneralizing research results, and Van
Leeuwen fails to point out that her concerns
about overgeneralization apply whether the
incident in question is part of a psychology
experiment or part of her personal experience.
Instead, Van Leeuwen labels this the “boy
who cried wolf effect” (p. 303) and asserts
that psychology’s practices have had a dele־
terious effect on helping behavior.
The tendency of people to be drawn to
personal experience and vivid stories is
understandable. Professors frequently run
into this in their classroom experiences.
Whenever presenting normative data it is
inevitable that some student will raise their
hand and point out that they “know someone”
who is not like that. What they fail to see is
that this personal experience adds only one to
the sample. When Van Leeuwen (1982)
experienced a student bursting into her office
and commenting about psychology it served as
an emotionally powerful support for her
beliefs. When Kilpatrick (1983) heard Erich
Fromm’s name mentioned in church and
noted a renewed interest in the sermon it
supported his claim that psychology was
replacing religion. But we need to recognize
that both of these incidents may be isolated
and atypical. The power of the personal
experience cannot be denied, yet the limits
must also be noted.
Researchers have documented this tendency for people to overgeneralize as a result
of a single vivid incident (e.g., Hamill, Wilson,
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& Nisbett, 1980). This so-called “vividness
effect” tends to invalidate statistical evidence
with a single example. Normally a single
example would have little statistical or logical
importance, but if the case is particularly vivid
in your mind then it assumes an importance
and influence in your thinking that is out of
proportion. It is understandable then, that
Kilpatrick (1983) and Van Leeuwen (1982)
would be so powerfully influenced by their
personal experiences. Kilpatrick seems particularly dominated by his subjective, vivid
experiences and these permeate his writings
about psychology. It is disturbing to realize
that he is passing these vivid examples on to
his readers through books and articles which
may be having a disproportionate influence on
Christians considering psychological services
or careers in psychology.
We do not doubt the authenticity of the
experiences of Kilpatrick (1983) and Van
Leeuwen (1982), but in addition to our
concern about overgeneralization, we cannot
help but wonder if any others present perceived
the event in the same way? Did others in the
congregation note the same increase in interest
that Kilpatrick noted upon the mention of
Erich Fromm? Or was it just that Kilpatrick’s
awareness level was increased by the mention
of a fellow psychologist? Did others present at
the suicide described by Van Leeuwen feel it
was “just another psychology experiment,”
and did they hesitate to call for help? Certainly
other anti-psychologists would tend to accept
this as further proof of psychology’s negative
effect, but is it really reliable? The power of the
personal experience tends to induce intellectual egocentrism, making it difficult to recognize
that others may not have reacted the same
way, or have perceived the same thing, as
yourself.
Scientific psychology is certainly not
immune to problems of subjective bias. The
picture of psychology as a completely objective,
carefully reasoned experimental science has
been successfully questioned by a variety of
psychologists, historians, and philosophers,
including Kuhn (1970) and Lakatos (1970).
In addition, the “halo effect,” a tendency to
generalize based on one positive quality, and
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the “experimenter bias effect,” the tendency
to distort research results to match your
hypotheses, are among the recognized subjective influences in psychology. But there are
two critical differences between empirical
psychology and the non-empirical approach
suggested by Van Leeuwen (1982,1985) and
Kilpatrick (1983, 1985). First, scientific
psychology has developed methodologies to
control for these recognized problems of
subjective bias. But in the anti-empirical world
of psychology’s critics no such methodologies
exist and subjective bias abounds. With the
scientific method, the use of control groups,
blind and double blind procedures, replication,
ancy o forth, all can help limit subjective bias.
No similar controls are possible in nonempirical approaches. The second difference
between empirical and subjective approaches
to psychology is that an empirical psychology
must ultimately face the test of public verification. Kilpatrick’s subjective view operates
within his personal reality, a reality that many
or few may share depending on their personal
experiences. Findings from empirical psychology, however, must be publically demonstrable
and verifiable. In the development of psychology, the scientific method was adopted as
a unique approach to the questions of
philosophy and as a way out of the trap of
subjectivism.
Should We Humanize
Psychology’s Methods?
According to the critics, psychology’s
methodological problems can be solved by
humanizing psychology. In writing about this
movement, Van Leeuwen (1985) says:
Human actions, they say, cannot be understood merely by
observation and description from an outsider’s point of
view
Consequently methods are needed that will
enable the scientist to understand, in active cooperation
with the subjects, how the subjects see their particular
situation, (pp. 73-74)

Another vocal advocate of a human psychology,
Kirk Farnsworth (1985), also favors getting
the “inside view” through a more subjective
approach to research. He would relabel the
subject in an experiment a “ co-investigator”

and believes that the goal of research should
be to “use the subjectivity of the co-investigator
rather than try to control it” (p. 38).
Attempts to get the psychological inside
view can be traced back to psychology’s
beginning and the use of the “introspective
method,” and is certainly not a new innovation. In fact, the inside view is valued in
psychology and is solicited through various
empirically derived self-report scales. There
are limits on the usefulness of the inside view,
however, even if it is approached systematically.
Hebb ( 1974), in reflecting on the push within
psychology to become a more “human”
science, points out that many of the early
founders of psychology, like Kulpe, Wundt,
and Titchener, took a subjective approach to
psychology and used introspection to get the
inside view. In comparing the contributions of
the early introspectionists to other psychologists who took an objective approach, such as
Kohler, Lewin, and Harlow, Hebb asks “what
is there to cite as a contribution from the
subjective method that can be put beside their
work?” (p. 74). Even contemporary psychologists who advocate a role for introspective
methods recognize the problems. Lieberman
(1979), in recommending a limited return to
the use of introspection, noted that “ introspection is limited not only in its scope. . . but
in its accuracy. In some cases, this may be
because of the subjects’ limited ability to
discriminate among internal states; in others,
because of forgetting or even dishonesty” (p.
332). Empirical methodologies can only be as
reliable as the information source, and
subjective experience is notably unreliable.
While it is recognized that scientific methods
cannot completely eliminate the problem of
subjectivism, procedures have been developed
for minimizing its influence. Abandoning or
significantly modifying these procedures would
be counterproductive unless the new methods
can deal with the inaccuracy of subjective
observations and the problems of forgetting
and dishonesty.
Van Leeuwen (1985) does not advocate a
complete abandonment of the scientific method,
but rather believes that we must be willing to
modify our procedures to allow the person
15
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being studied to be more human. To illustrate
the kind of research she believes psychology
should be engaged in, she cites a study of
adolescent values conducted by Tom Kitwood
(1980). In this preferred approach, 150
adolescents were presented with 15 common
“ situations” that were to be discussed with the
researcher. The adolescents were given the
situations a day or two ahead of time and could
choose which 10 of the 15 situations they
would like to discuss in a “chat” Each chat
took about a half day to complete. In order to
avoid an atmosphere of interrogation the
researcher took no notes during the session.
Van Leeuwen records that the interviews
“demanded a great deal of concentration and
imaginative understanding on the part of the
researcher” (p. 252). Again, we cannot help
wondering if the “imaginative understanding”
of another researcher would have produced
different results, especially since the researcher
recorded no data during approximately 600
hours of interviews. Van Leeuwen’s description
of this study suggests a method allowing the
subjects to carefully prepare their responses
and encouraging the researcher to interpret
their responses rather than gather data. It
seems likely that, rather than actually studying
the values of adolescents, the researcher
recorded his own interpretation of what
adolescents want researchers to believe their
values are.
In this more human approach even the
attempts to validate the findings are subjective.
In order to determine whether his subjects
were telling the truth during the interviews,
Kitwood (1980) simply asked them. Van
Leeuwen (1985) writes that followup letters
“confirmed both the methodological and
ethical success of Kitwood’s approach. The
participants uniformly stated that they had
spoken of their experiences in a sincere and
spontaneous manner—often surprising themselves in the process” (pp. 251-253). One
wonders how “ spontaneous” the responses
were when they could select the topics they
wished to discuss and had as much as two days
to prepare for the interview. It would also be of
interest to know whether the participants
would also confirm that what Kitwood recorded
16

through his “ imaginative understanding” was
truly representative of their values.
We can accept this type of research within
a broad definition of empiricism, but generalizations from these results would have to be
severely limited due to the subjectivism
introduced by the procedures. While Van
Leeuwen (1982) correctly points out that
rigorously controlled experimentation limits
generalizability, it is also true that generalization from research using the methods she
advocates should be even more restricted
Kitwood’s (1980) method is empirical in its
basic approach, but the procedures used raise
questions about the authenticity of the
responses, the accuracy of Kitwood’s imajjjpative interpretation of those responses, and the
validation procedures used Studies like these
may provide information which traditional
methods do not, but they certainly do not
improve generalizability.
On the Morality of Scientific Methods
Van Leeuwen (1982) has questioned the
morality of the scientific method because of
the necessity of using deception in certain
kinds of research, and implies this is a
particularly Christian concern. Similarly,
Farnsworth (1985) expresses concern about
the “possible harm from deception” and
writes that psychologists need to stop “lying”
(p. 25). We, too, are concerned with the moral
dilemma created by the necessary use of
deception and with researchers who step
beyond the ethical boundaries when using
deception. We contend, however, that unin־
tentional deception is often a hidden part of the
alternative methods the critics advocate. The
lack of control inherent in the methods of
“humanized research” greatly increases the
probability that the results could have been a
product of any number of uncontrolled
variables. The non־empirical researcher is
simply more vulnerable to self-deception.
Experimentalists are at least conscious of
their deception and use “debriefings” to
disclose the true nature of the research and to
deal with any discomforture that might have
been created. Why then is it immoral to
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intentionally deceive a subject for the purpose
of an experiment while it is not immoral to
unintentionally deceive a person by presenting
results which are likely to contain erroneous
conclusions? While some critics find objective
scientific methods unnecessarily restrictive
and counterproductive, most psychologists
would think it unethical to export research
without first subjecting it to empirical scrutiny.
Rather than scholarship hindering understanding, as Kilpatrick contends, a little scholarship
could prove to be the difference between
results which are exportable and results that
deceive the researcher or worse, the psychological consumer.
Conclusion
In examining the conflict between Christian
anti-psychologists and scientific psychology
we have focused on three points of contention.
The first is the difference over what is the most
valuable way of knowing. While we can
accept authority, intuition, and personal
experience as valuable approaches to learning,
we object when knowledge from these sources
is presumed in some way to be superior to
knowledge gained through observation, measurement, and experimentation. Each approach
should be valued for what it can contribute to
our understanding of what it means to be
human. Christian anti-psychologists make a
fundamental error when they discount psychological knowledge simply because it was
obtained through scientific methods.
The second major point of contention
between Christian anti-psychologists and
psychology is over the methodology involved.
The anti-psychologists believe that the seientifie method is a sterile approach to answering
the questions of psychology, since it does not
take into consideration the humanness of the
subject. While we are sympathetic to their
concern that psychology in its scientific form
will never be able to answer all the questions
we have about being human, we do not believe
that the methods of psychology should be
abandoned or significantly modified to allow
for subjectiveness in the manner they suggest
Substituting subjective approaches for objective

approaches is equivalent to choosing uncontrolled error over controlled error. Objectivity
continues to be a fruitful approach to
psychological studies and should not be
abandoned. Those who wish to look at
humanity from different perspectives need
only turn to other disciplines. Sociologists,
anthropologists, theologians, and creative
writers all contribute to our understanding.
Finally, Christian critics of psychology
have accused psychology of immorality
because of the deception inherent in some
methodology. We have tried to show that
deception also exists in the approaches
advocated by psychology^ critics but in an
uncontrolled and often hidden form. It could
be argued that deception in any form is
immoral but it seems inappropriate to argue
that one kind of deception is in some way
better than another. Psychologists recognize
the moral dilemma created by the necessity of
deception in research, have wrestled with the
issues, and have attempted to devise guidelines
for dealing with it. Advocates of a more
subjective methodology need to recognize the
self-deception that can occur as a result of the
procedures they use in gathering and interpreting data, and the moral dilemma created
when trying to generalize from their subjective
world.
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